Antidumping protection and welfare in a differentiated duopoly

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题名:	Antidumping protection and welfare in a differentiated duopoly
作者:	Chang, RY (Chang, Ray-Yun) Hwang, H (Hwang, Hong) Peng, CH (Peng, Cheng-Hau)
贡献者:	經濟系
关键词:	Antidumping policies Dumping measures Market protection Welfare
日期:	2020-07
上传时间:	2020-10-30 15:26:01 (UTC+8)
摘要:	This paper employs a two-country Cournot model to investigate the protection and welfare effects of an antidumping (AD) duty and a price-undertaking policy under different dumping measures (i.e., injury margin and dumping margin) in a differentiated duopoly. We show that the welfare levels of the host country and the world as a whole are lower under a price-undertaking policy than an AD-duty policy. However, the former is superior to the AD-duty policy in terms of protection. These results are robust even if the firms engage in Bertrand competition.
關聯:	JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 卷冊: 71 期: 3 頁數: 421-446
显示于类别:	[經濟學系暨經濟學系碩博士班] 期刊論文

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