Antidumping protection and welfare in a differentiated duopoly

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/48769

Title:	Antidumping protection and welfare in a differentiated duopoly
Authors:	Chang, RY (Chang, Ray-Yun) Hwang, H (Hwang, Hong) Peng, CH (Peng, Cheng-Hau)
Contributors:	經濟系
Keywords:	Antidumping policies Dumping measures Market protection Welfare
Date:	2020-07
Issue Date:	2020-10-30 15:26:01 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	This paper employs a two-country Cournot model to investigate the protection and welfare effects of an antidumping (AD) duty and a price-undertaking policy under different dumping measures (i.e., injury margin and dumping margin) in a differentiated duopoly. We show that the welfare levels of the host country and the world as a whole are lower under a price-undertaking policy than an AD-duty policy. However, the former is superior to the AD-duty policy in terms of protection. These results are robust even if the firms engage in Bertrand competition.
Relation:	JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW 卷冊: 71 期: 3 頁數: 421-446
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Economics & Graduate Institute of Economics ] journal articles

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