大同主義者對羅爾斯「以民族為中心」的全球正義理論普遍感到不滿，他們認為全球正義的主體應該是個人而不是民族或國家。不過，根據Kok-Chor Tan的分析，此一爭論的更深層的原因是：羅爾斯想追求一種獨立於整全式學說的政治正義觀，而Tan認為這不可能成功。Tan認為唯有訴諸於整全式自由主義的個人自主性觀念，自由主義才不會自我挫敗。本文作者認為Tan的批評是基於他對羅爾斯的建構論方法的誤解。為了澄清羅爾斯的政治建構論，本文詳細地闡釋羅爾斯的合理性的概念、迴避的方法、以及證立觀。透過此一分析，本文試圖展現羅爾斯進路的內在一致性，由此襯托出何以訴諸整全式的自由主義是不可行的，並透過這一方式間接地為羅爾斯的「以民族為中心」的進路辯護。
Most cosmopolitan liberals are discontented with John Rawls's theory of global justice. They believe that the basic unit of moral concern should be individuals not peoples, and Rawls's ”people-centric” approach is accountable for the flaws of The Law of Peoples. According to Kok-Chor Tan's analysis, however, this debate has a deeper root. He argues that the flaws of Rawls's The Law of Peoples are an accentuation of a problem inherent in political liberalism itself i.e., Rawls's aspiration for a conception of justice independent of comprehensive doctrines, which Tan contends impossible. Tan believes that only by appealing to comprehensive liberalism's idea of individual autonomy can liberalism avoid being self-defeating. In this article I argue that Tan's contention is based on misunderstandings of Rawls's method of constructivism. In order to clarify the nature of Rawls's political constructivism, I explain in details Rawls's ideas of the reasonable, method of avoidance, and justification. Through this explication of Rawls's ideas, I attempt to reveal the internal integrity of Rawls's constructivist approach, which by contrast also helps to explain why appealing to comprehensive liberalism is implausible. By refuting Tan's criticism of Rawls, I also mean to offer indirectly a defense of Rawls's ”people-centric” approach.
