雙邊市場下，廠商之組合銷售與品質決策

CCUR > College of Business > Department of International Trade 7 Graduate Institute of International Trade > Thesis > Item 987654321/53514

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/53514

Title:	雙邊市場下，廠商之組合銷售與品質決策 Bundling and Quality Strategy in Two-sided Markets
Authors:	姜信霖
Contributors:	國際貿易學系
Keywords:	雙邊平台市場組合銷售平台服務產品支付服務產品 Two-Sided Market Bundling Platform Service Product Payment Service Product
Date:	2024
Issue Date:	2024-07-17 14:36:54 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	在Epic控訴Apple案中，美國法院以Apple觸犯反競爭法，對其判決禁止將平台服務產品與支付服務產品進行組合銷售。本文設立獨占平台提供兩類型服務產品(平台服務與支付服務)的理論模型。假定平台服務產品為雙邊市場，而支付服務產品為單邊市場，分析平台的最適組合銷售決策與平台進行組合銷售對平台服務產品價格、支付服務產品價格與其品質水準和消費者剩餘的影響。本文發現，當消費端對平台服務產品的負面感受程度相對較小時，平台必採組合銷售策略。此外，消費端對平台服務產品的負面感受程度相對較大時，隨著負面感受程度越大，平台將降低其組合銷售誘因。平台採組合銷售策略將對平台服務產品之開發端定價提升、消費端價格不明確，並且兩端使用平台的人數上升。另外，組合銷售將提高支付服務產品之品質水準，但對價格與人數變化不明確。最後，平台採組合銷售對消費者剩餘的影響，主要取決於消費者對支付服務產品的品質邊際效用上界。當品質邊際效用上界相對小時，組合銷售對消費者剩餘必提升。 In the Epic v. Apple case, the U.S. court ruled that Apple violated antitrust laws and prohibited it from bundling platform service product and payment service product. This paper establishes a theoretical model of a monopoly platform providing two types of service products (platform service and payment service). Assuming that platform service product operates in a two-sided market and payment service product in a one-sided market, the analysis focuses on the best bundling strategy for platform and impact of the platform's bundling strategy on the prices of platform service product, the price and quality levels of payment service product, and consumer surplus. This paper finds that when the degree of consumers' negative perception of platform service product is relatively low, the platform necessarily adopts a bundling strategy. Furthermore, when the degree of consumers' negative perception of platform service product is relatively high, the platform's incentive to bundle decreases in the degree of negative perception. The platform's bundling strategy leads to an increase in the pricing for developers of platform service product, ambiguous on consumer-side pricing, and an increase in the number of users on both sides of the platform service product. Additionally, bundling improves the quality level of payment service product, but ambiguous changes in price and user numbers. Lastly, the impact of the platform's bundling on consumer surplus mainly depends on the upper bound of the marginal utility of quality for payment service product. When this upper bound is relatively low, bundling necessarily enhances consumer surplus.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of International Trade 7 Graduate Institute of International Trade ] Thesis

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