| 摘要: | 本論文在探討中共軍事菁英甄用與制度化之間的關係。採用「詮釋」與「科學」典範併行的方式，本研究進行了歷史敘事與文獻歸納的探討。文獻顯示中共在軍事人才的甄用上，有「個人背景」、「單位效應」、「權力群聚」、「團體利益」等四種觀點。為深入探討中共軍事人才甄用的規範面與實際面，本論文引用「菁英甄用理論」與中共「幹部職位名稱表」途徑，佐以上述四個文獻探討的面向，以呈現規範面與實際面的落差並探討其落差的原因。
本論文的研究樣本來自「中共研究資料庫」及日本「中國組織別人名簿」的軍事菁英表列；以2016年以來升任將軍的軍事菁英（共275人）爲對象。透過此275名將軍的人事資料，及其職位的異動時間與上升下降的流動方向，判斷其升遷途徑與中共軍隊人事制度上的差異，並採用統計學的邏輯斯迴歸分析(Logistic Regression ) 法，透過SPSS分析軟體，對造成此種差異的原因進行分析。
本研究的分析結果顯示，在中共軍事菁英甄用的四個面向中，個人背景中的功績、單位效應中的「拳頭部隊」與權力群聚的「習核心圈」對於甄用結果有最明顯的效果。其中，又以「習核心圈」因素，對於軍事人事晉升，有最大的影響力。
從以上的分析中也發現，中共在軍隊人員的退伍年齡及任職年限離場機制已規範；另在軍事專業方面，功績及擔任過「拳頭部隊長」對於晉升也有明顯影響。這些特徵固然體現了中共軍隊人事制度化及專業化的進程，但權力和忠誠度等「隱性關係」，使得權力派系因素仍然在軍隊的人事甄用上，起到了關鍵性的作用。派系內的「非制度化」限制了中共軍隊人事甄用制度化的落實，成為中共軍事現代化發展的絆腳石。此種升遷機制的制度落差，是否對中共期待在2025年前實現「強軍夢」的目標造成阻力，仍有待觀察。
This dissertation explores the relationship between the elite selection and institutionalization of Chinese military leaders. Adopting the parallel approach of "interpretation" and "scientific" paradigms, this research explores the historical narrative and the induction from the literatures. The literature review shows four perspectives on the Chinese mIlitary recruitment process, which are "personal background", "unit effect", "power clustering", and "group interests".
In order to explore the normative and practical aspects of the CCP’s military leader selection, this paper adopts the “Elite Recruitment Theory” and the CCP’s “Nomenklature System" approach, supplemented by the the above four literatures aspectives, to present the discrepancy between normative and practical results. The gap between the actual surface and the reasons of the gap are analylized.
The research data of this research come from the list of military elites in the "Chinese Communist Party Research Database" and Japan's "China directory in Pinyin and Wade-Giles". Based on the personnel data of these 275 generals, the mobility of their positions and the differences between their promotion paths and the personnel system of the Chinese Communist Army were examined, and the statistical Logistic Regression method was used to analyze the causal effect of these differences. Through SPSS analysis software, the reasons for this difference were analyzed.
The analytical results of this research show that among the four aspects of the CCP’s military elite selection, merit in the personal background, “fist troops” in the unit effect, and “Xi’s inner circle” of power clusters have the greatest effect on the selection results. Among them, the factor of "Xi's inner circle" has the greatest influence on the promotion of military personnel.
The analysis also found that the retirement age and length of service of the CCP’s military personnel have a routinized retire mechanism; in addition, in terms of military professions, merit and having served as a “fist captain troop” also have a significant impact on promotion. Although these characteristics reflect the process of institutionalization and professionalization of the CCP's military personnel, the "Unspoken rules" between power and loyalty makes power faction factors play a key role in the selection and employment of military personnel.
The above "de-institutionalization" within the faction limits the implementation of the institutionalization of the CCP's military personnel recruitment, and has become a stumbling block to the CCP's military modernization. It remains to be seen that if this institutional gap in the promotion mechanism will have resistance to the CCP's goal of realizing the "dream of a strong army" by 2025. |
