人是否具有自由意志？人是否真的應當為自己的行動負責任？這些問題吸引了許多哲學家、腦神經科學家、物理學家與生物學家們的關注，因為它們不僅牽涉我們對於這個物理世界的根本認識，也關乎責任、懲罰、道德、人性尊嚴這些人類社會的重要概念。在當代的哲學家中，Daniel Dennett是相當具有代表性的一位，他從早期的《迴旋空間：值得追求的自由意志類型》到後來的《自由演化》，都試圖辯護一種相容論的自由意志觀點：在一個決定論的宇宙之下，人類仍然具有決定自身行動的自由意志。他立基於演化生物學的基礎，試圖證明人類擁有迴旋的自由空間，並從多元決定論的立場，否定了非決定論的形上想像，並且也挑戰了將自由意志視為幻象的強決定論，最終證明人類的未來並不是被釘死與不可迴避的宿命。本文探討Dennett獨特的自由意志觀（有限度的實踐自由），並進一步檢視其可欲性。
Do we have free will? The so-called free will problem catches the imagination of generations of philosophers and contemporary neuroscientists, physicists and biologists for its immense implication on our understanding of the physical world as well as the essential constructs of human society, such as responsibility, punishment, morality and human dignity. Daniel Dennett is one of the most prominent philosophers who tackles the free will problem head-on. From the Elbow Room: The Varieties a/Free Will Worth Wanting to Freedom Evolves, Dennett has been attempting to defend the free will in compatibilism, which is compatible with a deterministic world. He lays out a theory of overdetermination based on his understanding of evolutionary biology and physicalism of the mind, and argues that human nature is not fixed and inevitable as hard determinism might claim. This paper examines Dennett's arguments in details and challenges the desirability of his conception of practical freedom, which may not be as viable as what he suggests.
