一個增強的密鑰變動型RFID認證協定

CCUR > College of Business > Department of Information Management & Graduate Institute of Information Management > Thesis > Item 987654321/45099

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://irlib.pccu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/45099

Title:	一個增強的密鑰變動型RFID認證協定 An improvement to a secret key changing RFID authentication protocol
Authors:	呂淑瑛
Contributors:	資訊管理學系
Keywords:	雙向認證資訊安全安全性分析無線射頻身份識別
Date:	2019
Issue Date:	2019-10-24 09:06:40 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	隨著科技的不斷進步，人們已普遍使用RFID (無線射頻身份識別)來快速又有效率地處理生活中的大小事。此外，使用RFID技術的物聯網興起需要有效的RFID身份識別認證協定，才能安全地防止網路傳遞的資訊不被攻擊者惡意篡改、假冒及無法使用…等等，而造成使用者財務和信用的重大損失。　　本研究探討如何利用RFID認證協定中密鑰變動的認證機制來抵抗標籤仿冒及阻絕服務攻擊。本研究首先針對Dass和Om及Yu和Zhang的RFID認證協定進行安全性分析，說明其安全漏洞，並針對Dass和Om協定，提出改良協定，來更有效地抵抗標籤仿冒攻擊及阻絕服務攻擊。　　本研究並將改良協定與Dass和Om及Yu和Zhang協定進行安全性及效能分析比較，證明本研究的改良協定具有良好的計算成本且能有效抵抗標籤仿冒攻擊及阻絕服務攻擊。 With the rapid development of technology, RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) has been widely used in everything of life. Also, the more massive using of RFID, the authentication protocol to secure information transmitted by the network are more important. The effective and efficient scheme can protect users from maliciously falsified, impersonated and unusable attacks that result in huge economic losses. This study explores how to use the schemes of key changes in RFID authentication protocols to defense tag spoofing and Denial-of-Service attacks. Firstly, we find the Dass and Oms and Yu and Zhangs RFID authentication protocols still have some security weaknesses. Secondly, we propose a light improved protocol for Dass and Oms scheme to resist attacks. Finally, we compare the improvement protocol with the Dass and Oms and Yu and Zhangs schemes with security and performance analysis that show the improved protocol has better performance and can effectively resist tag counterfeited and Dos attacks.
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Information Management & Graduate Institute of Information Management] Thesis

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