本論文自政策執行角度討論中國大陸基層鄉鎮政府在土地政策執行中緣何上有政策，下又如何具體對策，基於何種利益的問題。結合自上而下的制度環境及基層治理的角度，以及自下而上的執行環境及街頭官僚本身利益結構的問題，對於基層鄉鎮政府在土地政策執行具體展開討論，並在重慶地區各級土地部門通過訪談獲取一手資料進行研究。從地方治理的政商理論出發，具體觀察中國大陸農村土地產權移轉中，基層鄉鎮政府的核心利益結構。基本上，鄉鎮基層政權核心利益包含了兩個層面，一方面是不同時期中基層政府的政商利益輸送，另一方面，則是政府內部不同層級的利益結構。基層鄉鎮政府在土地產權移轉中，展現的不同層級的核心利益結構包括領導集團中政治企業家的個人利益、經濟利益、尋租利益、部門利益，形成一套綜合的層級利益結構。從中央基於耕地保護而要求地方執行「增減掛鉤」相關政策，詳細指出中央以「增減掛鉤」政策為主導的縱向維度時間軸和橫向維度的相關政策軸體現出條塊衝突和重重矛盾，包括行政幹預配置與市場調控之間的矛盾、土地資源分配的矛盾、以及土地收益分配矛盾。指出重重矛盾必然導致執行偏差的結果。鑑於土地政策制度環境存有缺失、錯位、空泛以及相悖的情境，地方政策執行時回應為自主變通、對著幹、虛擬上牆而懸置、逆變。
This paper focuses on the interest structure of rural township governance over land rights transfer in Mainland China from the view of a state-business theory. The core interests of a rural township ruling authority are composed of two items: profit transfer and profit structure. This paper suggests that rural township governments have changed from being “blind buyers” to becoming “senior rational investors”; their attitude toward markets has shifted from the explorative stage of “crossing a river by feeling one’s way over the stones” to the GDP first stage, and then to the stage of cautious and rational money management. Land rights transfers in rural townships provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs to seek their self-interest, for rural township governments to seek economic interests, for government-business relationship to seek rent-seeking interests, and for government departments to seek departmental interests. Based on the protection of cultivated land, the central government requires local governments to implement relevant policies of "increase or decrease linkage". This study points out the contradiction of the policy in detail, including the contradiction between the allocation of administrative intervention and market regulation, the contradiction between the distribution of land resources and the contradiction of the distribution of land income. This study also points out that many contradictions inevitably lead to deviations in execution. Because of the lack, dislocation, emptiness and contradiction of the institutional environment of the land policy, when the local government implements the central policy, the local government will respond to the central policy by flexibility, objection, low efficiency, selective execution, pseudo execution, suspension, or inversion.
