家族所有權、公司治理與風險承擔關係

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Title:	家族所有權、公司治理與風險承擔關係 The Relationship among Family Ownership, Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking
Authors:	陳怡珮林翠蓉侯啟娉張力謝佩娟
Contributors:	財金系
Keywords:	家族所有權公司治理風險承擔 Family ownership Corporate governance Risk-taking
Date:	2012-05
Issue Date:	2017-08-28 10:17:24 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文主要探討家族所有權、公司治理機制對公司風險承擔之影響，並以2001 至2008 年間台灣上市、上櫃共1208 家公司為樣本，進行假說之驗證。研究結果顯示，相較於非家族企業，家族企業風險承擔程度較高。顯示，台灣上市櫃家族企業中，控制股東與小股東間的核心代理問題甚為嚴重，使家族企業透過高風險的承擔剝削小股東；在將家族企業之經理人，區分為家族經理人與非家族經理人後，發現，相較於非家族經理人，家族經理人風險承擔程度較低。此結果表示，家族企業經營首重企業的傳承，因此偏好低風險的投資專案，且家族經理人會獲得管理上的職位，與其管理知識及能力並沒有太大的相關，使得風險承擔程度較低。此外，公司治理機制對風險承擔的差異影響分析發現，在家族企業中，董事會規模越大，公司風險承擔越低；外部董事比例越高，風險承擔越高；董事長兼任總經理，風險承擔越低。整體而言，本研究結果顯示，公司治理機制會影響公司中不同所有權特性股東所承擔之風險。 The study investigates the effects of family ownership and corporate governance mechanism on corporate risk-taking during 2001-2008. The empirical results show that family business undertakes more risk than non-family business, suggesting that the family tends to seek private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders because of the serious agency problem between majority and minority shareholders in family business. Furthermore, family members serving as CEOs undertake less risk than non-family CEOs in family business. We posit that the family prefers less risky investment projects because they seek to pass the firm to their heirs, not because of their expertise. The corporate governance mechanism also significantly influences the corporate risk-taking. The board size and the CEO duality are negatively related to the degree of corporate risk-taking, but the proportion of outside directors is positively related.
Relation:	輔仁管理評論 19:2 2012.05[民101.05] 頁59-90
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Banking & Finance ] periodical articles

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