本文在Mari?oso模型架構下發現：廠商於對本身主體與其他品牌附件是否相容的決策，係取決於他們在產品市場上的競爭方式，如果廠商採取不合作的競爭方式，則其將選擇相容策略；反之，如果市場呈現勾結的合作解，則其產品將不會與其他廠牌相容，以持續其在下游附件市場的壟斷地位。
Under the specifications of Mari?oso's model, this article finds that, for individual firms, the choice of interbred compatibility depends on how they compete in the market. If firms are faced with a non-cooperative game in the market, they will choose the regime that is compatible. On the other hand, if firms collude in order to monopolize the market, they will revert to the regime that is incompatible.
