本篇論文旨在研究康德《判斷力批判》一書中，針對盛行於十八世紀末的柔美與雄渾美學相對觀的討論，以及對主客體之間關係的剖析。康德的雄渾觀與前輩柏克相近，兩位皆主張雄渾感起源於主體對於不可理解的客體所產生的驚異（terror）之感。不同的是，柏克的雄渾將人類想像力與上帝存在連結，但康德則認為雄渾感最終目的在於證實人類理智力量的偉大。在柔美方面的探討，康德不若柏克只著眼在客體的可愛之處，反將重心放在客體投射於主體內心的感受，以及主體在認知與想像力之中所欲保持的平衡點。康德認為主體在審美的過程中，必須排除所有雜念及慾望，方能感受客體純淨之美。柔美的意義不在客體本身，而在主體決定賦予客體何種地位與形式存在。本文質疑康德的主體經驗在歷經社會化的過程之後，如何還能保有淨純不含雜質的審美觀；又，柔美感的發生並不只與主體有關，客體依然有其存在的必要與價值。
The primary goal of this study is to reveal the strategies Kant occupied to render his concepts of the beautiful and the sublime in The Critique of Judgment. By exemplifying the similarities and differences between Kant's and Burke's analyses of the aesthetics, this paper proposes to illustrate the complexes and paradoxes in Kant's reflective judgment. When applying Kant's idea of pure aesthetic judgment to either literary texts or objects in reality, we can hardly neglect several philosophical antinomies in his ideas of free and dependent beauties. This study aims to question the existence of aesthetic purity as well as reclaim the function and meaning of the object as Kant focused merely on the inner feeling of the subject. His judgment of the sublime, on the other hand, presents a more consistent picture that reveals not merely his “sense of imaginative inadequacy” but also his optimistic belief in human reason and the supersensible power inside human mind.
