本研究計畫嘗試利用中國西漢到清末合計2,050 年的考試任官與政治制度等資料，探討 科舉與專制間的相關現象。按宋朝以前，中國官僚的任用大致上是透過郡國察舉(或九品中 正)，由地方選舉(或推薦)世家子弟出任政府官員。此等官員出身門閥大家，背後有強大的封 建勢力支援，並能相互奧援與皇權相抗衡，因而使中國政治能維持一個類似19 世紀西方的 開明專制。但宋代以後，皇帝開始推行科舉制度，一方面賦予庶民公平的參政機會，使得布 衣可以卿相；另方面，則以恭順服從的庶民官僚代替桀傲不馴的世族官僚，使科舉被濫用成 為壓制世族官僚與控制學術思想的一種政治鬥爭工具。科舉從發軔到成熟，也就反映了君主 集權相對貴族分權的一路成長，使中國發展成為一個不折不扣的極權國家。因此，本研究主 要目的即在於 (1) 建立理論與實證模型來探討：到底是甚麼因素導致皇權高漲，使君主有 能力排除貴族干政並順利推行科舉？(2) 利用賽局的激勵相容條件來研究：文武科舉出身的 名臣大將何以未能仿效以往門閥世族相互奧援與皇權抗衡，卻是甘為奴才任由皇帝肆意擺布， 使中國君主專制於明清兩代達於頂峰？以經濟學角度言，以上課題除涉及自然環境變遷外， 宋以後中國農業型態由麵食生產(奴工制的粗放耕作)轉變成為米食生產(租佃式的密集耕作)， 使得地方必須仰仗中央提供水利灌溉與安全保護，似乎也助長了極權政體的建立與八股科舉 的出現。 This project proposes to investigate the interdependent relationship between political autocracy and imperial examination by using a dataset encompassing Chinese politics and examinations that covers a period of 2,050 years. Before the Song Dynasty, Chinese officials were mainly recruited from local noble families through election and investigation based on prefectures and principalities. Since these nobles possessed privileged political powers that were vested in them by the feudal barons, they could easily unite to check and balance the emperor’s power. Therefore, Chinese politics remained quite stable during the phase of enlightened autocracy. However, after the Song Dynasty, the emperors began to implement the imperial examination system, which not only bestowed upon the common people the right to serve as government officials, but also allowed the king to replace the noble officials with plebeian officials. This turned the Chinese civil service examination system into a political instrument that was used by the emperor to counter the noble group. In other words, the increased reliance on the examination system was in part responsible for the shift in Chinese politics from the enlightened autocracy in Western Europe to a centralized despotism. Based on this, the main purpose of this study is to explore the following two questions: (1) What was the reason behind making the emperor strong in order to withstand opposition from the nobles and implement the imperial examination? (2) Why were the plebeian officials so amenable in subordinating themselves to the emperor, instead of colluding to stand against him? From the economic viewpoint, other than changes in weather environment, these issues might be related to the switch of agricultural production from land-intensive wheat cultivation to labor-intensive rice cultivation.
