本研究以2007年至2013年間設有審計委員會之上市櫃(含興櫃)公司為研究對象，於公開資訊觀測站之公司股東會年報蒐集獨立董事背景資料，從其經歷區分擁有財會專精、監督專精及產業專精三者，以探討審計委員會擁有單一專精或混合專精，是否能有抑制實質盈餘管理。而本研究進一步探討會計師產業專精對盈餘管理之影響，是否也能有效抑制實質盈餘管理行為。
實證結果發現，審計委員會同時擁有產業及財會專精之審計委員會，呈現顯著負相關，代表審計委員會同時擁有產業及財會專精之成員，確實能有效抑制實質盈餘管理行為。審計委員會擁有單一專精或同時擁有產業及監督專精或同時擁有財會及監督專精，皆未達顯著負相關。然而，產業、財會及監督專精同時進行探討，則呈現顯著負相關，代表審計委員會成員擁有多項專精時，確實有效抑制實質盈餘管理。此外，本研究也發現會計師擁有產業專精時，也能有效抑制實質盈餘管理行為。
In this study, we used exchange listed companies adopt audit committee, collected the Market Observation Post System of annual reports and independent directors back-ground data sample companies during the 2007-2013. The background classified as ac-counting financial expertise, supervisory expertise, and industry expertise, we want to know audit committee have single expertise or mix expertise will be associated with decrease effect on real earnings management. In addition, this study explores auditor industry expertise will be associated with decrease effect on real earnings management.
These results suggest that the combination of industry expertise and accounting fi-nancial expertise is more effective in curtailing real earnings management behaviors. Audit committee have single expertise or the combination of industry expertise and su-pervisory expertise or the combination of accounting financial expertise and supervisory expertise is not more effective in curtailing earnings management behaviors. However, empirical findings indicate that the combination of industry expertise, accounting finan-cial expertise, and supervisory expertise is more effective in curtailing real earnings management behaviors. In addition, the auditor industry expertise is more effective in curtailing real earnings management.
