官僚組織往往須面對眾多不同來源、不同內容的課責要求（稱為課責困境），而官僚組織將如何回應互相衝突的課責要求，乃一有趣、值得探究的問題。本論文基於理性選擇的假設，將官僚組織內的行為主體視為一「理性」的個人，主張個人將會先求其個人私的動機之滿足，再設法滿足公的動機。故官僚組織在面對課責困境時，首先將設法利用資訊上的優勢，採取欺瞞策略，逃脫外部的有效課責，如不能採取欺瞞策略時，在違法性沒有疑慮的前提下，官僚組織將以遵從層級課責為優先，政治課責次之，最後才會顧及到專業課責。建構出理論後，本論文再以我國實際發生過有關官僚組織課責行為的爭議個案為例，進行理論的驗證工作，以確定該理論是否成立，而其解釋實際案例的能力如何。
Facing various sources of accountability and conflicting demands, bureaucracy needs to response in a way that minimizes the unfavorable consequences of its actions. How bureaucracy acts is an interesting question and worthy of inquiry. Based on the paradigm of rational choice, this dissertation seeks to formulate a theory which treats actors within bureaucracy as a “rational” individual who tend to pursue his personal private goals first and place organizational public goals secondly. When the actors are in a position of accountability paradox, they seek to escape external accountability by means of superior information. If this cannot be achieved, they place legal accountability first, followed by hierarchical accountability, then political accountability, and with professional accountability the least desirable. This dissertation then verifies the theory by means of applying it to several concrete cases in order to test its validity and capability of interpretation.
