| 摘要: | 相較於傳統的貿易政策,反傾銷政策是近年來各國政府較常用於保護本國廠商的政策 之一。 因此,其與廠商間的技術授權及研發投資都可能是影響廠商間競爭與促進技術進步 的重要因素。然而,現有文獻卻甚少針對反傾銷政策如何影響授權廠商選擇最適研發投資 量和最適授權金, 以及三者間的相互影響關係進行較為深入的研究與探討。 有鑑於此, 本 計畫將以產業內授權作為分析主軸, 建立一個結合反傾銷政策、 國際技術授權與研發投 資的一般化模型。 根據此模型, 我們將探討當授權廠商為被限制廠商 (或為被保護廠商) 時, 授權廠商如何決定最適研發投資量與最適權利金, 以及兩家廠商如何在 Cournot 數 量競爭下決定均衡數量等議題。 再者, 本計畫將分析反傾銷政策以及技術授權的有無對 授權廠商選擇最適研發投資量的影響, 以及研發投資量為內生與外生時對各種貿易政策 下的本國社會福利及保護效果的影響及差異。 此外, 本計畫將進一步分析比較在兩種技 術授權方式下各種本國政府的貿易政策對市場均衡的影響及差異, 與在各種本國政府的 貿易政策下技術授權的有無對市場均衡的影響及差異。 最後, 本計畫也將探討當兩家廠 商進行 Bertrand 價格競爭時, 在各種市場情況下, 授權廠商如何決定研發投資量與權利 金等議題。
As is well-known, in contrast with the conventional trade policies that governments may undertake, antidumping policies have become the most popular ones to protect the local firms against the foreign competitors. Undoubtedly, these policies as well as technology licensing and R&D are crucial to firm competition and helping technological progress. There are few papers, however, focus on analyzing their interactions, especially how the antidumping policies would affect the R&D investment, licensing fees or royalty rates. Therefore, in this project, I aim at proposing a general framework with technology licensing, R&D, and two kinds of antidumping policies–antidumping duties and price undertaking. Under Cournot competition, I will analyze how a licensor determines R&D investment, fixed licensing fee and royalty rate white licensing its technology to its rival, and what the equilibrium quantities are. Besides, this project will analyze how these two kinds of antidumping policies and technology licensing affect the optimal R&D. In order to study these issues more clearly, I will systematically analyze the existence of market equilibriums corresponding to various model settings and the differences between them. Moreover, based on the proposed framework in this project, I will also study above issues again under Bertrand competition. |
