隨著經濟環境的發展，企業對執行企業社會責任的態度，已從單純的非必要性逐漸轉變為公司治理的核心價值，有許多企業也將社會責任報告書與財務報表同時揭露予財務報表外部使用者。再者，財務報導的透明度也代表企業對投資人、債權人、利害關係人等之社會責任；但隨著代理理論所衍生出之機會主義行為，管理當局可能會利用社會責任活動以掩飾其盈餘管理行為。本研究將針對財務報導透明假說及機會主義假說做競爭性檢定，同時將判斷公司治理機制的四種項目－獨立董監席次比率、董監事持股比率、席次盈餘偏離差及外部法人持股比率，探討其對盈餘管理之影響。
本研究以裁決性應計數之絕對值做為盈餘管理之代理變數，並以所得之資料，採用敘述性統計分析以了解其樣本之特性及分佈狀況，並運用相關係數分析，檢視各變數之相關程度，最後以迴歸分析檢視企業社會責任、公司治理與盈餘管理之關係。
實證結果發現，財務報導透明假說獲得支持；另外，獨立董監持股比率、董監事持股比率及外部法人持股比率，和盈餘管理呈顯著負向關係；席次盈餘偏離差與盈餘管理呈顯著正向關係。
With the development of the economic environment, many firms taking an attitude toward CSR is not just dispensable, but necessary as core value of corporate governance. However, there are many firms disclose their CSR reporting and financial statements to the external users. Furthermore, the transparency of financial reporting indicates that it is social responsibility for investors, creditors and stakeholders. Nevertheless, when the agency theory derives opportunism the management may exploit the CSR behavior to carry out the earnings management. The result is support transparent financial reporting hypothesis And the same time, we use the four items of corporate governance that the ratio of independent and supervisors, the ratio of director and supervisors ,the ratio of director earnings deviation and the ratio of external in institutional ownership.We use discretionary as a proxy for earings management and find the characteristics (ratio of independent and supervisors, the ratio of director and supervisors and the ratio of external in institutional ownership) will lower the degree of management. On the other hand, we find the director earnings deviation will increase the extent of eanrings management.
