品質改善的技術創新與技術授權是促進技術進步的兩個關鍵因素。然而，現有文獻卻很少 對廠商如何選擇最適授權的產品品質與最適授權策略，以及兩者間的關係與影響等議題進行 深入的硏究與探討。有鑑於此，本計畫將建立一個結合垂直產品差異性、成本差異性及技術 授權的一般化模型，並藉此探討在數量（價格）競爭下，授權廠商如何決定最適授權的產品品 質與最適權利金，以及兩家廠商如何決定均衡數量（價格）等議題。再者，本計畫將分析成本 差異性對最適授權的產品品質與最適授權策略的影響。在計畫中，我將依序分析比較各種模 型設定下市場均衡的存在及差異，以期能完整地探討此議題。最後，藉由此計畫，我將更進一 步分析當授權廠商不參與最終產品市場競爭（產業外授權）時，在各種市場情況下，授權廠商 如何決定最適授權的產品品質、 最適授權的廠商家數與最適授權策略等議題。 Quality-improving innovation and technology licensing are two key factors in helping technological progress of an economy. There are few papers, however, focus on how a firm chooses the optimal level of quality to license and the optimal licensing contracts, and on the related issues. Therefore, in this project, I aim at proposing a general model which introduces vertical product differentiation, cost asymmetry and various technology licensing policies, to analyze how a firm determines the level of quality to license, fixed fee or royalty rate, price and quantity in equilibrium, under both Bertrand and Cournot competitions. Besides, this project will analyze how the cost asymmetry affects the optimal quality to license and the optimal licensing contracts. In order to study this issue more clearly, I will systematically analyze the existence of the corresponding market equilibriums and the differences between them. Moreover, based on the proposed models in this project, I will examine how an outside patent holder choose the optimal quality to license and the optimal licensing contracts under various market conditions.
