關鍵詞：聯合行為、水泥產業、超額產能。
Abstract
After the mass-production period 1998-2010, the excess capacity of cement industry happened every year. The Cartel often used excess capacity as a tool to threaten firms not to lower selling price secretly. If the firms lower selling price secretly, the members of the Cartel would increase the production to lower the price which cause serious collapse to the firms.
In this paper, David I. Rosenbaum (1989) excess capacity model is used to investigate whether if firms may betray others by producing secretly. Also, analyzing the yearly information of the cement industry from 1991 to 2010 to dissect whether there is collusion.
The results show that there was no collusion in Taiwan's cement industry. And the results are different with the Rosenbaum (1989) excess capacity model. The research shows the excess capacity is related with it deeply. It shows that there are lots of excess capacities after researching into each firm. That is why that the extremely low utilization rate was happened, but the cement market in Taiwan is belong to highly oligopolistic industry structure. The productive ratios of TCC and ACC in Taiwan market are principal. The excess capacity of the entire industry is the total of each firm, not just research for the single individual. According to the mention above, the average of entire utilization rate is as high as 78%.The more excess capacities comes the higher possibility of bringing collusion. As the result, the excess capacity in Taiwan is not enough to bring collusion.
