心靈在因果上的不可化約性與統合論

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Title:	心靈在因果上的不可化約性與統合論
Authors:	冀劍制
Contributors:	中國文化大學
Keywords:	自由意志化約因果意識戴維森
Date:	2010-06-01
Issue Date:	2012-03-22 11:59:27 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	如果我們相信心靈由大腦的作用所產生，那麼，大腦作用至少在因果上可以解釋心靈在因果層面的運作，但是語言的可說與不可說性的差別、戴維森的充要條件論證以及自由意志的問題卻指出這種因果的化約是無法達成的。藉由這個化約的困難，本文更進一步論證指出，如果接受自由意志的存在，那麼，現今的心靈與物理概念框架都是錯的，心物在因果方面必須統合在另一個全新的概念框架之中。因為，(1)兩個概念框架不相融合，(2)物理概念框架根本上完全無法解釋自由意志的可能性，這個概念框架不可能用來統合心物，而且，(3)心靈概念框架因缺乏充要條件結構的恆常性也無法用來解釋物理的因果現象的恆常性。 If we believe that the mind is generated from the brain, then we should be able to explain the mind at least in the causal respect through brain activities. However, the difficulty of clearly expressing experiences, Davidson's argument and the problem of free will show that this kind of causal reduction cannot be done. Based on this irreducibility, I also argue that conceptual frameworks of the mental and the physical are both mistaken because (1) they are not coherent, and (2) present physical conceptual framework cannot explain free will, thus this conceptual framework cannot be applied to unify the mind and the brain, and (3) the conceptual framework of the mental is hard to causally explain the physical which is mainly structured through necessary and sufficient conditions.
Relation:	華岡哲學學報 2期 P.1-20
Appears in Collections:	[Philosophy Department and Graduate School] academic journal

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