文化大學機構典藏 CCUR:Item 987654321/20522
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    题名: The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies
    作者: Chang, RY (Chang, Ray-Yun)
    Fung, KC (Fung, K. C.)
    Lin, CC (Lin, Chelsea C.)
    贡献者: 經濟系
    日期: 2009
    上传时间: 2011-11-30 13:17:16 (UTC+8)
    摘要: This paper applies Grossman and Helpman's (1994) common agency model to investigate the formation of strategic export subsidy and strategic import tariff under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. The results of this paper indicate that even with political pressure, the Grossman-Helpman politically-determined export policy is identical to the rent-shifting export policy, which is export subsidy (export tax) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition. The politically-determined import tariff will be higher than the optimal level. This paper highlights the possibility that lobbying can restore the level of trade intervention to a more efficient one in the absence of the benevolent dictator.
    显示于类别:[經濟學系暨經濟學系碩博士班] 期刊論文

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