| 摘要: | 文武關係(civil-military relations)是發展中國家政局穩定和國家發展的重要指標。共黨國家的文武關係更是它維持政權的「柱石」。觀察二十一世紀中共國家發展和兩岸關係演變，文武關係與共軍的政治角色，是非常重要的指標，殊值吾人深入探討分析。
從中共「十六大」起，胡錦濤開始成為名義上黨的領導人，在「繼承轉型」期間，由於江澤民續任軍委會主席，形成了「兩個中心」的困局，以及由純文人軍委主席代表軍方利益與純文人黨的領導人互動的特殊現象，無法真正落實「以黨領軍」。中共十六屆四中全會後，胡錦濤掌握黨政軍「三位一體」的權力，進入「繼承鞏固」階段。由於胡無法藉由個人權威牢固地掌控軍隊，轉而強調「依法治軍」，並逐步落實黨與軍隊的制度化，以及持續現代化軍隊建設，因而有不少學者樂觀地認為共軍的專業化，將促成黨軍分立甚至分離，由共產黨國家的革命型軍隊走向西方民主國家的專業型軍隊。
本文從中共文武關係研究文獻，以及文武關係歷史回顧中，得悉中共的文武關係並非一成不變，而是因勢調整，與時俱進的，在持續中有變遷，在演變中有堅持。探析影響胡錦濤主政時期文武關係的主要因素(面向)，包括了靜態層面的「意識型態」、「歷史遺緒」和「組織結構」三項，由於其根本的屬性和結構，並未完全改變，因而對文武關係影響的程度相對有限。在動態因素(面向)，包括有「政治繼承」、「派系政治」、「政治參與」、「國防經費」、「軍事專業化」、「政工運作」和「對台政策」七項，均屬於實際運作層面，易於受到客觀的國內外環境變動，以及本身應變態度與能力的影響。因而，儘管胡錦濤仍堅守著「黨控制」的基本模式，但受到1990年代初期後，中共黨軍權力共棲的現象隨著世代交替而改變，以及面對市場經濟和未來戰場的衝擊，在黨與軍隊改良、調適的過程中，傳統的文武關係型態也會隨之而轉變。
綜合言之，由於黨軍一體化的組織結構和「以黨領軍」的意識型態，是塑造共軍工具性角色形成的主因，胡錦濤仍繼續堅持而不會全盤棄守，以作為其鞏固軍權的基礎。此外，胡提出了「科學發展觀」作為軍隊建設的指導方針，並賦予共軍「三個提供、一個發揮」新的時代使命與職責，以期能「以軍護黨」，貫徹黨的方針和路線。然而，現階段中共的權力結構，已由傳統權威、魅力權威轉向合法理性權威。在權力運作上，屬於法定職權型領導人的胡錦濤，必須透過正式的制度權力，結合非正式的提攜關係，以及在施政上滿足共軍的組織利益等多種途徑，才能真正獲取軍方的認同與支持。因而，必須持續支持共軍朝向現代化發展的各項活動和經費，並在軍事事務上給予較大的自主權力。當然這並不意味著「黨指揮槍」的原則遭到破壞，基本上共軍仍未能脫離「具有專業特色的黨軍」角色，只是黨對軍隊的控制不再處於「支配與被支配」關係，文武關係與時俱進地轉換為一種相對弱勢「以黨領軍」格局下的「利益共享」關係。
Civil-military relations are an important indicator of political stability and national development for developing countries. It is the bedrock upon which communist countries build to maintain their regime in particular. In order to analyze the development of the Mainland China and cross-strait relations in 21st Century, civil-military relations and the political role of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are of merits exploration.
Hu Jintao became the leader of the Party nominally since the 16th National People’s Congress. During the transition period, a predicament of “Two Ruling Centers” was inevitably formed as Jiang Zemin was reappointed the Chairman of Central Military Commission. As a result, an unusual phenomenon appeared in the interaction between the sheer civilians-led Military Commission in favor of the Military and civilians-led representative of the Party. Therefore, the communist notion of “Military led by the Party” could not be realized completely. President Hu Jintao had the “Three in One” power, namely, party, politics, and military and thereby proceeded to “the phase of succession and consolidation” right after the Communist 4th Mid-Committee, 16th National People’s Congress. Due to Hu’s incapability of imposing strict controls on the Army, he turned to stress “military ruled by regulations”, systematized progressively the Party and the troops, and continued the modernization of PLA. Consequently, several scholars have been considering optimistically that the PLA’s specialization will eventually lead to the Army’s independence from the Party authority or even separation, causing the revolutionary-style armed forces of a communistic country to move toward a professional one of a western democratic country.
Based on the related literatures of China’s civil-military relations and its history, this study reveals that civil-military relations of PRC are not always consistent, but adjustable and progressive to suit the current situation. Thus, the relations keep transforming and remain some insistence in the movement. There are three main factors (dimensions) that affect civil-military relations during Hu’s terms, including the static aspects: “ideological stereotype”, “historical sentiment”, and “organization structure”. However, the nature and structure have not fully changed yet and thereby the degree to which they affect civil-military relations is relatively small. The dynamic factors (dimensions) contain seven items: “political inheritance”, “factional politics”, “political participation”, “national defense budget”, “military specialization”, “politics worker handling”, and “policies towards Taiwan”. All of them deal with the actual administration and tend to be affected by domestic and international situations as well as the attitude and ability of dealing with contingency and emergency. Therefore, the phenomena of which the power of China’s Communist Party and military co-exist will be shattered since the early 90s in accordance with the succession of generations, despite the fact that President Hu insists the fundamental model of the “Communist Party Control”. Still, facing market economic and the impact of the future warfare, the mode of traditional civil-military relations will transform accordingly in the process of the improvement and adjustment of the Communist Party and PLA.
In conclusion, President Hu will not abandon, but proceed with what he believes in the unification of organization with framework and the notion of “military led by the Party”, which maintains PLA’s primary political function, in order to consolidate his hold on military power. In addition, President Hu addressed “Scientific Development Perspective” as the guidelines of the armed forces development and assigned the Army a brand new mission and obligation “three provisions and one development” in order to fulfill the Party’s instructions. However, the current power structure of the Communist Party has transformed from traditional authority and charismatic authority into legalized and legitimate authority. Only when President Hu authorized by his legal position, combines his informal inheritance relationship with formal power system and other medium to satisfy the interests of the military organization in the policies will he be able to obtain the PLA’s recognition and support. Therefore, supporting various campaigns and budgets in favor of the military modernization and more autonomy in the military issues is required. It does not necessarily mean the principle of “the Party as a commanding gun” is fading. Basically, the Army does not separate itself from the role of “the communist armed forces with expertise”. Rather, the Party’s control over the armed forces is not a relationship between “dominate and subordinate” anymore. Civil-military relations, as time passes by, have gradually turned to be a “benefits sharing” relation in a relatively weak “military-led” framework. |
