甘迺迪政府時期，中蘇共於第三世界競逐影響力。蘇共領袖赫魯雪夫面臨國內要求增加軍費開支，以及中共批評他對西方過於軟弱的雙重壓力；中共並且無視於赫魯雪夫提供核子傘保護的承諾，推動自身的核武計畫。中蘇共之間的緊張關係迅速升高為雙方敵對性的言辭交鋒，進而引發邊境衝突。由於不確定中蘇共磨擦的程度與持久性，甘迺迪政府最初對中蘇共之間的齟齬採取謹慎的因應態度，並未尋求與莫斯科結盟。然而在1961年底，美方各種情報顯示中蘇共分裂程度加深，復以甘迺迪政府於當年感恩節的人事改組，使得認定中蘇共分裂升高的官員影響力大增。中印邊界戰爭及古巴飛彈危機後，甘迺迪政府確定中蘇共分裂的持久性。至1963年，甘迺迪本人確信中蘇共的緊張意味國際共產主義運動已產生分裂，因而甘迺迪政府開始操弄戰略三角賽局，希望藉由有限核試條約來防止蘇聯將核武技術提供給中共，透過此方式，美國進一步有效地離間了中蘇共。
Throughout the Kennedy years, the Soviet Union and Communist China competed for influence over Communist nations in the Third World. Khrushchev faced domestic pressure to increase Soviet military spending and criticism from the Chinese for allegedly being soft against the West. PRC was also developing a nuclear weapons program despite Khrushchev’s preference to keep Beijing under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Sino-Soviet tension soon caused hostile rhetoric between the two nations and sporadic fighting along shared borders. Initially, however, the Kennedy administration assumed a gingerly public approach toward the split, and did not seek an alignment with Moscow. This was due to uncertainty about the scope and endurance of Sino-Soviet friction. At the end of 1961, indicators of the deepening rift combined with the Thanksgiving Day reshuffle to increase the influence of those American watchers who pronounced the split profound. After the Sino-Indian war and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the administration was certain about the perpetuation of the split. By 1963, Kennedy recognized that Sino-Soviet tension meant there was a split in international communism, and so the Kennedy administration sought to play the strategic triangular game. The administration tried to use test ban treaty to prevent the Soviets from giving nuclear technology to Beijing. In this way, the Kennedy administration drove Moscow and Beijing further apart.
